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STATE ACTION AFTER THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 
David A. Strauss• 
The legal campaign against state-enforced racial segregation 
had far-reaching effects on the law. Not only equal protection and 
antidiscrimination law, but areas as disparate as federalism, labor 
law, criminal procedure, and freedom of expression were signifi-
cantly affected by the civil rights revolution. Few legal principles, 
however, were more deeply affected than the state action doctrine. 
The state action doctrine limits the reach of constitutional re-
quirements. Except for the Thirteenth Amendment, and perhaps 
the right to travel, constitutional guarantees (it is conventionally 
said) apply only to actions of the state, not to actions of private 
parties. During the civil rights revolution, the state action doctrine 
became, in a word, the enemy. That happened because proponents 
of discrimination tried to portray discrimination, whenever they 
could, as the product of private, not state, action. In that way they 
could shelter discrimination from the substantive guarantees of the 
Constitution. 
The great state action cases of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s took 
this form. In each case, someone explicitly discriminated on the 
basis of race. In fact, each of these cases involved not just an inci-
dental act of discrimination but an integral aspect of a broad dis-
criminatory and segregationist regime. That is why the cases were 
so notorious. In each case, the defense strategy was to claim that 
the discrimination that was occurring-the particular aspect of the 
Jim Crow regime that was under attack-was in fact the work of 
private actors, not of the state. 
In Shelley v. Kraemer, the practice was racial discrimination in 
housing. In the white primary cases, Smith v. Allwright and Terry v. 
Adams, the practice was racial discrimination in voting rights; in 
the sit-in cases and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, the 
practice was discrimination in public accommodations. Each of 
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these mainstays of the regime of racial discrimination was defended 
in court on the ground that the discrimination was the work of pri-
vate actors. In each case, federal law could be used against an as-
pect of the Jim Crow regime only if the Supreme Court satisfied 
itself that the state was sufficiently implicated in overt and wide-
spread discriminatory practices. 
In this context the state action doctrine came to be seen by 
many as an accomplice to racism. Charles Black's great article on 
the subject expressed this view: 
[The state action doctrine] now exists principally as a hope 
in the minds of racists (whether for love or profit) that "some-
where, somehow, to some extent," community organization of 
racial discrimination can be so featly [sic] managed as to force 
the Court admiringly to confess that this time it cannot tell 
where the pea is hidden .... The amenability of racial injustice to 
national legal correction is inversely proportional to the durabil-
ity and scope of the state action "doctrine," and of the ways of 
thinking to which it is linked. I 
Much of this opprobrium continues to cling to the state action prin-
ciple. The state action requirement is seen by many as a barrier to 
eliminating wrongs that are in fact of constitutional magnitude but 
that have been disingenuously portrayed as the actions of private 
parties in order to avoid the mandate of the Constitution. In this 
paper I want to suggest that this attitude toward the state action 
principle, absolutely appropriate when the issue was Jim Crow ra-
cial segregation, today tends to point us in almost exactly the wrong 
direction. 
The legacy of the intertwining of the state action requirement 
and the civil rights movement is that the state action requirement is 
interpreted asymmetrically. When the actions of a unit of govern-
ment are at issue, the state action requirement is interpreted formal-
istically: the actions of a government are always, ipso facto, "state 
action" for constitutional purposes. But when the actions of a pri-
vate party are at issue, the state action requirement is interpreted 
antiformalistically. Private actions may or may not be "state ac-
tion," depending on a variety of functional concerns. This made 
perfect sense in the era of the civil rights movement but, it seems to 
me, no longer makes sense today. 
In this paper I am not concerned with the usual source of con-
troversy about the state action doctrine-the question when private 
1. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," 
Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 69, 95, 10 (1967) (foot-
notes omitted) (quoting Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 473 (1953)). 
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actions should be treated as "state action" and subjected to consti-
tutional limits. Instead, I want to suggest that the automatic treat-
ment of all actions of the government as "state action" --or at least 
as all equally state action-should be qualified in favor of a more 
thoroughgoing functionalism. The point is not that we should con-
clude that the actions of units of government are not "state action" 
at all and therefore are not subject to constitutional limits. Rather, 
many actions by units of government have some of the attributes of 
private action. Accordingly they should be judged by standards dif-
ferent from those which we apply to more purely governmental 
action. 
Concretely, in the current state of doctrine, this means two 
things. First, it means an expanded role for something akin to the 
"unconstitutional conditions" doctrine. Second, it means that we 
should reconsider a suggestion once made by Justice Harlan but not 
accepted by the Supreme Court: that the actions of state and local 
governments should be subject to less stringent constitutional re-
view than the actions of the federal government.2 
I. STATE ACTION IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 
From about 1890 to about 1970, a particular form of racial 
discrimination existed in the South. Obviously racial discrimina-
tion existed before then, after then, and elsewhere. But there was 
then a distinctive regime that no longer exists. To some degree 
courts and lawyers were (or seemed to be) the heroes in bringing 
down that regime. Because of that, and because now everyone 
agrees that that regime was wrong, we understandably generalize 
the lessons from the campaign against Jim Crow. 
The Jim Crow system was, however, distinctive in many ways. 
One of the most important of its distinctive characteristics was a 
blurring of the line between the public and private realms. South-
ern society enforced the subordination of African-Americans by a 
range of practices only some of which formally involved the law. 
But whether they formally involved the law was basically 
incidental. 
For example, states sometimes enacted laws requiring segrega-
tion or discrimination in employment or public accommodations. 
But sometimes social pressure alone was effective, without legal 
sanctions. Very often, violence and other wrongful conduct against 
African-Americans was formally illegal, but the laws were not en-
2. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 503-06 (1957) (opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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forced-because the sheriffs were too intimidated, because they 
chose to look away, or because they too were riding with the Klan. 
Certain conditions peculiar to the South at the time permitted 
this combination of social and governmental forces to be used. For 
the most part the Jim Crow South was rural. As in many rural 
settings, local areas were dominated by traditional elites that ruled 
essentially without challenge. The political, social, business, and 
government elites by and large were not distinct. Mobility was lim-
ited, and the elites faced little competition from outside forces. Un-
til around the end of World War II at least, important national 
institutions-not just the federal government, but the national 
press, national firms, or national trade unions-had little presence 
throughout much of the South. The white population was insular 
and relatively homogeneous. 
These conditions made it relatively easy to organize informal 
social sanctions. Whether the white majority worked its will 
through the government or through informal social mechanisms 
was nearly a matter of indifference. Often, of course, the Jim Crow 
regime was enforced not just by social sanctions but by extra-legal 
violence. But then all that was needed was for the law enforcement 
authorities to tum a blind eye. It is difficult to review government 
decisions not to enforce the law even in the best of circumstances. 
In an insular society dominated by traditional elites, reviewing a 
nonenforcement decision is even harder. 
In these circumstances it does not make a lot of sense to distin-
guish between state action and private action. Racially restrictive 
covenants, white primaries, segregation in public accommodations, 
discrimination in employment-all of these were indeed forms of 
"community organization of racial discrimination. "3 Whether the 
community organization happened to use the mechanism of the 
government instead of one of the other available mechanisms was 
essentially a fortuity, and it makes little sense to have the outcome 
of a legal challenge tum on such a fortuity. Nor does it make sense 
to have the outcome tum on an inherently uncertain judicial review 
of alleged discriminatory underenforcement of the law by local po-
lice. It was clear enough that violence against African-Americans 
was socially approved and socially protected by the dominant pow-
ers of the community. It hardly mattered whether the local police 
sought to intervene but were intimidated, failed to intervene because 
they made a good faith resource allocation decision that it would be 
a waste of effort to challenge the overwhelming private force behind 
3. Black, 81 Harv. L. Rev. at 96 (cited in note 1). 
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Jim Crow, or failed to intervene for discriminatory reasons. The 
problem was a system deeply woven into the fabric of the society. 
These conditions made attitudes like Charles Black's perfectly 
appropriate. The state action requirement, applied to such a sys-
tem, was a formalism that served only to generate arbitrary results 
and to allow some socially organized racial discrimination, of a kind 
that was clearly condemned by the Constitution, to survive. 
In addition, expanding the category of "state action" is a way 
of putting the courts in charge of a problem. During the civil rights 
era, particularly before the federal civil rights legislation of the mid-
1960s, the federal courts were already interpreting the Constitution 
to forbid racial discrimination. They were also much more likely 
than Congress to be vigorous about fighting discrimination. One of 
the standard explanations for Brown (and a factor that may have 
decided some of the Justices' votes in the case) was that Congress, 
stalemated by the filibuster, was institutionally unable to enact any 
serious civil rights legislation. 
Expanding "state action" was a way of bypassing Congress; it 
was functionally equivalent to getting a range of civil rights legisla-
tion enacted before Congress was willing to do so. Shelley v. Krae-
mer anticipated the federal open housing laws by more than twenty 
years; the white primary cases adumbrated the Voting Rights Act 
by more than a decade; the sit-in cases were made moot by the pub-
lic accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
This is not just a strategic or result-oriented reason for ex-
panding the category of "state action." The Carolene Products jus-
tification for Brown and similar decisions was precisely that the 
courts were better suited to address issues of racial discrimination 
than the legislatures. Until at least the late 1960s, African-Ameri-
cans were without question unfairly deprived of political power in 
the South and therefore in Congress as well. In that context, the 
Carolene Products argument for shifting issues from the legislatures 
to the courts was about as strong as it could be. 
The Carolene Products approach is usually seen as a basis for 
expanding substantive constitutional guarantees. But there is no 
reason that it should not also have influenced the interpretation of 
the state action doctrine. The courts' superior capacity to deal with 
race discrimination issues, as well as the interpenetration of the 
public and private spheres that characterized Jim Crow, were both 
justifications (and sufficient justifications) for an expansive view of 
what constituted state action. 
The result, quite appropriately, was the asymmetrical doctrine 
I mentioned earlier. When the government was actually caught 
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red-handed, discriminating against African-Americans, then of 
course there was state action. Formal arguments alone were suffi-
cient to show state action there. But even when the government 
was nominally not involved, the functional equivalent of state ac-
tion might still be present, because much private action was for all 
practical purposes indistinguishable from government action. In 
this context, an asymmetrical and partly formalistic state action 
doctrine was not unprincipled; it was a plausible adaptation of the 
doctrine to particular historical conditions. 
II. STATE ACTION AFTER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 
To a substantial degree, the conditions that led to the view that 
the state action doctrine was "the enemy" no longer exist today. 
Many (not all) of the constitutional issues that confront the courts 
today are not characterized by the interpenetrated public-private 
pattern of oppression that was typical of the Jim Crow regime. In-
stead of a situation in which the moral imperative is clear, and the 
difficulty is in deciding how and how far to enforce it, we are more 
likely today to have morally equivocal situations. The legislative 
blockage that characterized the civil rights era does not exist in the 
same form, and to the extent that it does the courts are often not a 
remedy. 
Consider a few constitutional issues that are on the frontier 
today: 
• May a state university adopt rules against hate speech and 
harassment? 
• May a municipality enact an ordinance restricting the sale 
of sexually explicit material on the ground that it subordinates 
women? 
• May a municipality adopt an "integration maintenance" 
plan that limits minority enrollment in, for example, a publicly 
owned housing complex, in order to prevent the complex from "tip-
ping" and becoming all-minority instead of integrated? 
• May a municipality limit enrollment in a public high school 
to African-American males, in the hope of improving their 
education? 
• May a city with a large minority population, surrounded by 
affiuent suburbs, adopt extensive affirmative action measures in 
public contracting and employment? 
• May one county in a state engage in aggressive environ-
mental protection to a degree that arguably constitutes a taking of 
property without just compensation? 
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• May a state government adopt a system of public financing 
of elections and sharply limit contributions to political campaigns? 
These issues have in common a number of features that con-
trast sharply with the Brown-era issues.4 
1. The lack of certainty. Jim Crow racial segregation was an 
unambiguous moral wrong; when the government did it, it was an 
unambiguous constitutional wrong. Most people, I believe, would 
not say that the issues I just mentioned are comparably 
unambiguous. 
2. The need for experimentation. Not only are these issues 
uncertain, but for many of them, the right answer ought to depend 
on facts that might be learned through deliberate experimentation. 
Will the hate speech rules chill genuine contributions to intellectual 
debate? Will integration maintenance plans and all-minority, single 
gender schools produce the desired effects, or will they become a 
cover for invidious discrimination? Will the affirmative action 
measures benefit the minority population as a whole or only certain 
already well-off segments of the minority population?s Will the en-
vironmental regulations create greater environmental burdens else-
where? Is the campaign finance reform in fact just a means of 
incumbent protection? 
In each of these cases, it would be useful to have answers to 
these questions before we assessed the constitutionality of the pro-
posed government action. Consequently there is much to be said 
for allowing deliberate experimentation on questions of this kind. 
At least at first, the best state of affairs might not be one in which 
either every government or no government is allowed to adopt 
measures of these kinds. It might be better to allow some such 
measures to go forward while monitoring their effects, before we 
decide whether this kind of regulation is constitutional. 
3. A division of state and society. In many (at least) of the 
instances I just described, the unity of state and society that charac-
terized Jim Crow racial segregation will be absent. There will not 
necessarily be social forces directed toward accomplishing essen-
tially the same things as the government action. Indeed, in each 
4. Among other things, in each of these cases, many "liberals" or "progressives" will 
in general be much more favorable to allowing the government to act and to construing the 
constitutional provision narrowly. I return to this point and its significance below. 
5. My own view is that affirmative action is in general unproblematic as a constitu-
tional matter. The only concern that might raise a constitutional issue is whether it harms 
minority group members, for example by stigmatizing them. But for many the constitution-
ality of an affirmative action measure (and not just its wisdom as a matter of policy) might 
depend on a question of the kind mentioned in the text. 
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case powerful constituencies in the community will probably oppose 
the government action. 
4. Market pressures on the government. In many of the cases 
I mentioned, the government will also be subject to market forces 
that limit its freedom of action. Public universities must compete in 
a market with private universities. The affirmative action measure 
will help the suburbs compete with the city for contractors and em-
ployees. The environmental regulation will enable other counties to 
profit from the taxes and economic opportunities made available by 
development. 
One has to be careful not to overstate the contrast with racial 
segregation in the South. There were market forces that en-
couraged the South to abandon segregation. Nonetheless in the 
early period (until perhaps the mid or late 1950s) segregation 
seemed mostly impervious to these pressures. Even into the 1960s 
local elites were often well enough entrenched to resist economic 
pressure. In any event, many Southern communities that practiced 
official racial segregation were not part of a reasonably well-func-
tioning and vigorous market like that involved in at least some of 
the modern examples I gave. 
If I am right that the cases I mentioned differ from segregation 
in this respect, the asymmetrical character of state action doc-
trine-a powerful legacy of the civil rights era-is not justified to-
day. The doctrine ought to be functional in both directions, so to 
speak. Under current doctrine, when nominally private action is 
functionally little different from government action, it is treated like 
government action. But to the extent that a government entity is 
subject to the market, its actions, while nominally governmental, 
have much in common with private action. Arguably, then, there-
straints imposed on such government action should be correspond-
ingly less stringent. 
5. Superior legislative competence. The relationship of the 
courts and the legislature that characterized Jim Crow is inverted in 
these cases. The point is not the parochial one that "progressives" 
now think the courts are less sympathetic to their interests than the 
legislatures will be. Jim Crow laws presented, as I said, a case of 
the kind envisioned in the Carolene Products footnote-one in 
which the legislative process was blocked and the courts were the 
only effective recourse. But in the cases I listed above, there is no 
such blockage. To the extent that any of the issues I mentioned 
presents a threat to constitutional rights, it is not obvious that Con-
gress is less able than the courts to deal with the threat. 
In addition, these cases require responsiveness to empirical 
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findings and tolerance for experimentation. Courts are not accus-
tomed to changing their positions in the short term in response to 
new facts about society, and judicial doctrines-except those that 
permit the government to act as it wishes-are seldom designed to 
accommodate experimentation. Legislatures and bureaucracies, for 
all their other limits, are better able to do both. 
Even if experimentation is not called for-even if we are con-
sidering the category of clearly wrong government actions-Con-
gress (or state legislatures) might do an adequate job of protecting 
constitutional liberties today. In many antidiscrimination areas-
housing, voting, employment, education, race, gender, religion, dis-
ability, age-federal statutes have not only duplicated but exceeded 
constitutional requirements. Federal law has also provided some 
protection against state regulation of property, mostly by virtue of 
federal preemption of state law. So far there has been relatively 
little activity by the federal government to protect free speech 
rights, but there is no obvious reason why Congress could not act in 
that area as well. 
In short, all of the reasons for the well-justified hostility to the 
state action doctrine, and for the asymmetry and formalism that 
characterized the state action doctrine of the civil rights era, are to 
some extent inapplicable to issues that are on the frontier of consti-
tutional law today. But only to some extent. There may be present 
day counterparts to the widespread combined public and private 
discrimination of the Jim Crow regime, such as in the treatment of 
gays and lesbians and perhaps in gender discrimination. There are 
non-frontier issues that are not uncertain and do not call for experi-
mentation: local officials who might use the machinery of govern-
ment to silence critics; state universities that want to engage in 
unjustifiable discrimination against certain political points of view; 
municipalities that might permit pernicious racial, ethnic or reli-
gious discrimination; opportunistic and oppressively unfair regula-
tion of property. Some of what I called frontier issues, of course, 
might seem to other people to fall in one of these categories. Some-
times the government will not be subject to countervailing political 
and social pressures from within or market forces from without. 
Even when it is subject to market forces, the market will almost 
never be perfect; it is costly to move to a different municipality or to 
have to attend a private university instead of a state university. 
Finally, it seems mistaken to rely entirely on Congress for the 
protection of constitutional rights: many of those rights protect po-
litically weak groups, and Congress will not stand up to national 
public opinion. Ironically, the congressional response to the civil 
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rights movement may suggest that the legislative process is better at 
protecting constitutional rights than it actually is. In the civil rights 
era, the threat was regional, and Congress may do better when it is 
acting against distinctively regional oppression. If there is a na-
tional tide of sentiment against a certain kind of speech, or unfamil-
iar religions, or the supposed enforcement of political correctness 
on campuses, or for that matter against banks or automobile insur-
ance companies, Congress cannot be trusted to provide the needed 
protection of constitutional rights. 
III. A REVISED DOCTRINE? 
It seems, then, that an approach that seeks to expand the cate-
gory of state action and that views all actions by governmental enti-
ties as equally threatening may no longer be appropriate. But the 
opposite approach, which would often regard governmental actions 
as functionally private and therefore exempt from constitutional 
guarantees, is also not appropriate. Today, there is sometimes (not 
always) a reason to treat government actions as more like (but not 
exactly like) private actions for constitutional purposes. 
This suggests that the civil rights era approach to the state ac-
tion doctrine should be not so much reversed as transcended. For 
many cases the question should not be whether the action is govern-
mental, and therefore fully subject to constitutional limits, or pri-
vate, and therefore not subject to constitutional limits. Rather the 
question should be how we can loosen the constitutional limits on 
certain kinds of government action without removing them entirely. 
Suppose arguendo that the best state of affairs, for now, is that 
some but not all universities have hate speech codes, some but not 
all municipalities regulate pornography, and so on. If there were a 
national wave of opinion that threatened to impose homogeneity, 
the courts should intervene. Declaring these actions not to be state 
action, and therefore not subject to constitutional limits, would dis-
able the courts from doing so. But if they are state action, and 
therefore subject to constitutional limits, it is difficult to see how the 
courts can allow experimentation in any principled way. 
Two solutions seem plausible. One is to follow Justice 
Harlan's suggestion and to judge the actions of state and local gov-
ernments less strictly than the actions of the federal government. In 
the Jim Crow era, that would have been a recipe for perpetuating a 
system of regional oppression that the federal government was re-
sponsible for ending. But today such an approach poses less risk of 
opening the door to regional oppression, and a better chance of al-
lowing beneficial experimentation. 
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A related possibility is to try to reorient the inquiry from-in a 
word-rights to systemic concerns. Ordinarily when we interpret 
the First Amendment or the Just Compensation Clause or the 
Equal Protection Clause, we try to decide whether a person has a 
right to be free of a certain kind of regulation or discrimination. 
That question requires a nationwide yes or no answer that seems ill-
adapted to at least some of the issues I discussed earlier. In dealing 
with those issues it seems better to focus not on rights but instead 
on whether the system as a whole has too much supposedly benign 
segregation, too much suppression of pornography or hate speech, 
or too much regulation of property or campaign contributions. 
The constitutional question, therefore, should be not whether a 
measure violates the rights of the party complaining about it, but 
rather whether the overall system is healthy. Some experimentation 
along what I characterized as the frontier is consistent with a 
healthy system. Uniform regulation might not be. 
There are at least two substantial objections to these possible 
approaches. The first objection is that they allow too many actions 
that ought not be allowed: even one instance of certain kinds of 
regulation and discrimination is too much. The answer-perhaps 
not an adequate answer-is one I sketched above: perhaps legisla-
tures can be relied on to deal with those cases; and perhaps this is 
the price we should be prepared to pay for allowing heterogeneity 
on the issues where heterogeneity seems desirable. There may be 
instances in which we would not want to tolerate experimentation 
and heterogeneity; as I said earlier, there may be latter-day counter-
parts to racial segregation. But we should at least entertain the pos-
sibility that a uniform national standard is the exception that 
requires justification, rather than the rule. 
The second objection is that an approach focusing on the over-
all health of the system is too difficult for anyone to manage, and 
hopeless for a court. But such systemic issues are increasingly the 
kind of questions that the courts have to answer anyway. It is, in 
particular, a component of the unconstitutional conditions or selec-
tive funding question that is increasingly salient in constitutional 
law. 
Many of the issues I mentioned earlier can be recast in terms of 
selective funding or unconstitutional conditions. When a local gov-
ernment (a university or a municipality) prohibits an activity, it 
does not make it entirely impossible for people to engage in that 
activity. It increases the cost of doing so. If you want to engage in 
hate speech or pornography, or if you want to operate your firm 
free from the regulation in question, you have to move. It is materi-
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ally different from Jim Crow because you will probably only have to 
move a few miles or transfer to a nearby school, instead of migrat-
ing to a different region of the country. In principle the effect is just 
as if the government denied you a tax exemption. 
In the end, then, the problem with the civil rights era's version 
of the state action doctrine may be that, applied to today's issues, it 
masks the prevalence of one of the most difficult problems of consti-
tutional law. We are accustomed to looking at allegations of local 
violations of constitutional rights and seeing an imitation of South-
ern racial segregation circa 1960--a more faint and less malign imi-
tation, but structurally the same thing. Often, though, that is not 
what we have. We have something that is more like, but not en-
tirely like, private action. It is less threatening to constitutional val-
ues but much more difficult to accommodate to constitutional 
doctrine or judicial enforcement. It is commonly said that constitu-
tional law should try to move past Brown. Perhaps this is one of the 
directions in which it should move. 
